Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium on Professional
Negligence

Article 14

6-1959

Liability of an Insurance Agent or Broker in Procuring or
Maintaining Insurance for an Owner
Jack D. McNeil

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Agency Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jack D. McNeil, Liability of an Insurance Agent or Broker in Procuring or Maintaining Insurance for an
Owner, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 839 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

1959 ]

NOTES

subject to suit for negligent conduct at almost every turn. However,
at the present time they appear to be in the advantageous position in
most states of not being liable for negligence resulting only in mental
anguish. Only a few states have departed from the rule; and the
departure is apparently only in breach of contract actions. Most of
the contract cases imposing liability on morticians involve wilful and
wanton conduct, and in this regard only a few states still deny
recovery. Presently recovery in tort requires some accompanying
physical injury.
It is felt that the courts will eventually come to the position of
allowing recovery for mental anquish alone which results from
negligence in the care of dead bodies. Perhaps fabrication of mental
anguish in the ordinary case is a sufficient danger upon which to base
denial of recovery when that is the only damage alleged. However,
cases concerning dead bodies are out of the ordinary and involve the
great probability of emotional distress and suffering by the family
when they learn of some misconduct towards their deceased.
It appears that the present general rule is based not on compensation for mental injury, but on punishment for malicious conduct.
While this may result in justice to the injured party when wanton
conduct is involved, it does not do so when one who suffers the same
injury cannot recover because the responsible party was merely negligent and not malicious. Surely, the courts will eventually realize
that mental disturbance should be compensable even though there is
no additional physical harm or there is no wanton conduct involved
in producing the disturbance.
EDGAR E. SMITH

LIABILITY OF AN INSURANCE AGENT OR BROKER
IN PROCURING OR MAINTAINING INSURANCE
FOR AN OWNER
The insurance agent or broker is vulnerable to legal attack on several grounds and may incur liability on a variety of theories ranging
2
from breach of implied warranty1 to fraudulent misrepresentation.
The basic fact situation here discussed arises when one desires insurance and the agent sought for the purpose of procuring that insurance
1. Erie Motor Freight, Inc. v. Terminal Ins. Agency Co., 48 Ohio App. 1, 192
N.E. 362, 364 (1934).
2. Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 16, 22 P.2d 35 (1933);
Williams v. Neal, 52 Ga. App. 553, 183 S.E. 650 (1936).
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fails to do so through a lack of reasonable care. The nature and origin
of the duty owed by such an agent or broker, the various instances in
which liability arises, the measure and amount of damages collectible,
and the defenses available to the agent are discussed.
An agent may have as his principal a property owner. Or an agent
may be acting primarily for an insurance company by soliciting prospective customers and attempting to place business with the company
he represents. 3 In contrast, a broker is an agent who acts as middleman4 between one seeking a policy and an insurance company. The
broker is not employed by any particular company; and once an order
for insurance is procured from one seeking a policy, the insurance is
placed with an insurance company of the prospective policyholder's
choice or the broker is free to select any company that may give the
protection desired.5 Whether one is an agent or a broker is a question
of fact.6 Since a broker is an agent of the policy owner in procuring
the desired contract, in addition to being an agent of the insurance
company for purposes of collecting payments for the company,7 a
separate analysis seems unnecessary in most instances.
The correlation of the agent to the respective poles of owner or insurer becomes important when suit is contemplated by the property
owner or a proposed donee beneficiary. If an agent of a prospective
policyholder fails to effect a policy and the owner is harmed due to
the lack of insurance, recourse is limited to the agent. But if the person at fault is the agent of an insurance company, recovery may be
had against either the agent,8 the company 9 or both.10 The insurance company is liable if the tortious acts of the agent arose from activities within the scope of the agent's employment;" but if the agent
acted outside of the scope of employment, the suit can only be successful against the agent. The distinction is important since the
insurance company will ordinarily be more able to give relief to the
plaintiff.
3. E.g., see the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Osborn v.
Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 60 (1940). One can be agent for the assured and also agent
for the insurer in the same transaction as long as the knowledge of the dual
capacity is possessed by the assured and the insurer. North British and M.
Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 26 Ore. 199, 37 Pac. 909 (1894).
4. Gay v. Lavina State Bank, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921). And see
Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of Louisville, 243 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1951); Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 163 Va. 349, 175 S.E. 763 (1934).
5. See Arff v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 125 N.Y. 57, 25 N.E. 1073 (1890).
6. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 163 Va. 349, 175 S.E. 763 (1934).
7. Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. 1009, (1918) (by
implication); Gay v. Lavina State Bank, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921).
8. Briggs v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 155 N.C. 73, 70 S.E. 1068 (1911).
9. See cases cited in note 21 infra.
10. Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. 1009 (1918).
11. Ibid.
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NOTES
DUTY-NATURE AND ORIGIN

Some of the earlier American cases have allowed recovery to an
owner without stating whether the theory of the suit was contract or
tort. 2 The more recent decisions have used one of the two theories,
while a few jurisdictions have found the agent liable on a statutory
13
ground.
It would seem that ordinarily the person who promises to procure
insurance is under contract duty that must be performed with reasonable care. 14 For the formation of the contract there must be an offer
and acceptance.' 5 The contract may be express 16 or implied 7 and
payment of premium by the owner before suit is unnecessary. 18 A
failure to procure which is attributable to a lack of due care constitues
a breach of contract 19 for which the agent or broker is liable in con20
tract.
Some cases 21 and secondary authorities have taken the position that
failure to procure is a tort and have attached the consequences of tort
liability in the cases arising in this field. The two theories are so interrelated that a court deciding a case on a contract theory has held that
a charge to the jury was correct which described the contractual duty
12. Rezac v. Zima, 96 Kan. 752, 153 Pac. 500 (1915); Lindsay v. Pettigrew,
5 S.D. 500, 59 N.W. 726 (1894).
13. Latham Mercantile & Commercial Co. v. Harrod, 71 Kan. 565, 81 Pac.
214 (1905); Morton v. Hart, 88 Tenn. 427, 12 S.W. 1026 (1890). And see text
accompanying note 44 infra.
14. Derby v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230 S.W.2d 481 (1950) (agent liable
for negligent failure to procure workmen's compensation insurance); Mayhew
v. Glazier, 68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843 (1920) (agent liable for breach of contract to insure crops); Case v. Ewbanks, Ewbanks & Co., 194 N.C. 775, 140 S.E.
709 (1927); Stevens v. Wafer, 14 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Rainer v.
Schulte, 133 Wis. 130, 113 N.W. 396 (1907) (agent liable for breach of contract
to insure building). 'This conversation and course of conduct do not support
the conclusion that the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff to
procure for the plaintiff the desired insurance. The strongest inference of
which it is susceptible is that the defendant would use reasonable effort to
procure such insurance." Heaphy v. Kimball, 293 Mass. 414, 200 N.E. 551, 553
(1936). (Emphasis added.)
15. Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 41 Atl. 352 (1898).
16. 2 Coucu, INsURANcE LAW § 441 (1929).
17. Ibid.
18. Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953).
19. Mayhew v. Glazier, 68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843 (1920); Ursini v. Goldman,
118 Conn. 554, 173 Atl. 789 (1934).
20. Derby v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230 S.W.2d 481 (1950); Mayhew v.
Glazier, 68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843 (1920); Ursini v. Goldman, 118 Conn. 554,
173 Atl. 789 (1934); Gay v. Lavina, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921). Ela v.
French, 11 N.H. 356 (1840). Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599,
109 S.E. 632 (1921). See Dargan v. Robinson, 140 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) (dictum). And see Sheller v. Seattle Title Trust Co., 120 Wash.
140, 206 Pac. 847 (1922), where a statute was basis for the court to hold the
face value of the policy was recoverable and the value of the property
destroyed was not the limit.
21. Wallade v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. 1009 (1918);
Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912);
Kaw Brick Co. v. Hogsett & Woodward, 73 Mo. App. 432 (1898).
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in terms that properly could be used to describe the facets of due care
under tort laws.P
Cases conflict on the degree of definiteness of coverage that must be
present before the agent is accountable. An early case held an agent
free of liability for failure to procure where a former policy was indicated as the measure of coverage but present instructions were vague
23
as to the amount of coverage, premium, duration, and risk insured.
More recent decisions seem prone to place the agent under a duty to
insure by standards of the previous policy and customs pertaining to
the subject matter and area for terms not in the policy.2 4
A leading case following the contract theory of liability is Marano
v. Sabbio2 5 where the defendant broker promised to procure burglary
insurance and failed. Property of the plaintiff was stolen under conditions that would have allowed the plaintiff to recover his losses if the
desired insurance had been obtained. The broker was held liable for
the value of the property stolen on the theory that the defendant had
a contract duty and failed to perform due to a lack of reasonable
care.26 Other courts have found liability under the contract theory
27
under similar circumstances.
Under the contract theory, consideration moving from the agent or
broker can readily be found by the express or implied promise to procure or maintain the insurance in question. But finding consideration
moving from the property owner is sometimes more difficult. If the
owner pays or promises to pay a sum of money to the agent in return
for the agent's promise to procure, clearly there is consideration
moving from the owner. Where an owner consigned books to a consignee who promised, as part of his contract, to procure and maintain
insurance and the consignee failed to obtain insurance before the
books were destroyed, the consideration moving to the promisor was
the retention of part of the sale price of the books.28
22. Defendant agent promised to procure workmen's compensation insurance for plaintiff employer. The defendant failed and one of plaintiff's employees was injured during employment and recovered from plaintiff. The
lower court held that the defendant agent had breached his contractual duty
to procure because he had failed to use "ordinary care or diligence in his
effort to provide said insurance." The defendant contended that the instruction was error because "it spoke to the jury in the languages of both contract
and tort." Held, no error. "A contract requiring, either expressly or by
inference, that a party use in a given transaction the same standard of care
as is fixed by the law of Torts is altogether valid and permissible." Derby v.
Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230 S.W.2d 481, 483 (1950).
23. Mooney v. Merriam, 77 Kan. 305, 94 Pac. 263 (1908).
24. Stevens v. Wafer, 14 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
25. 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953).

26. Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953).
27. Derby v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230 S.W.2d 481 (1950); Gay v.
Lavina, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921); Ela v. French, 11 N.H. 356 (1840);
Milliken v. Woodward, 64 N.J.L. 444, 45 Atl. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
28. Ela v. French, 11 N.H. 356 (1840).
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In the precedent-making Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co.29 the
owner's promise to take the policy, if procured by the agent, was held
to be consideration that bound the agent to a contract duty to procure
and held him liable for the failure to do so due to a lack of reasonable
care. In such cases the fact that the agent has not signed a writing
containing the agreement does not defeat the owner's recovery.3°
Suppose there is no justifiable basis for a court to hold that the
agent or broker has received consideration? Authorities have tended
to turn to tort principles and rely on the common law distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. 31 If the agent or broker has
not received consideration and has not taken any steps to obtain the
insurance as promised, this is held to be nonfeasance. The agent
is not liable for a breach of contract because he has not received
consideration. 32 And there is no liability in tort because of the common law rule that there is no liability in the absence of misfeasance.

33

The most famous American case to expound this proposition is
Thorne v. Deas.3 4 There, the plaintiffs together owned one-half of a
ship, the Sea Nymph. Defendant owned the remaining one-half interest. One of the plaintiffs expressed the opinion that insurance should
be secured on the ship, and the defendant made statements from
which one could find that the defendant expressed an intention to procure the insurance. The defendant took no steps to get the insurancealthough there was sufficient time to act-and the ship was destroyed
at sea. The plaintiffs brought an action on the case, a tort theory of
recovery. The court held for the defendant on the ground that the defendant had been guilty of a nonfeasance in failing to procure the
insurance and therefore was not liable in tort because there was no
35
duty owed to obtain the coverage desired.
As has been indicated, some authorities make the broad general
statement that the owner has the choice of suing the agent under
either the tort or contract theories. 36 And some jurisdictions following
29. 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).

30. Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953). And
see note 70 infra.
31. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY

§ 516 (4th ed. 1952).

32. See Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 77, 97 (N.Y. 1809) (dictum).
33. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 77 (N.Y. 1809). An agent who receives no
compensation can be held liable for misfeasance in attempting to procure
insurance. Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75, 170 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1793).
34. 4 Johns. 77 (N.Y. 1809).

35. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 77 (N.Y. 1809).
36. "Where he [the agent] undertakes to procure a policy affording protection against a designated risk, the law imposes upon him an obligation to
perform with reasonable care the duty he has assumed, and he may be held
liable for loss properly attributable to his default. The principal may sue
either for breach of the contract or in tort for breach of duty imposed by
it." Ursini v. Goldman, 118 Conn. 554, 173 Atl. 789, 791 (1934). Elam v.
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the tort theory have held that the duty to use reasonable care arises
from the fact that when a state allows an insurance company to incorporate, the company assumes a duty to act so that the citizens of the
state will not be harmed.3 7 Regardless of whether there is a choice of
theories in a given jurisdiction, it would seem clear that some courts
have allowed a recovery in tort on facts that would call for recovery
under the contract theory in other jurisdictions. 38 For example, in
Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.39 an agent of Hartford promised to
procure insurance on plaintiff's stock of drugs and the furniture and
fixtures of the drugstore. At the time of the solicitation the plaintiff
had the property insured with another company, and the expiration
date was only a few days off. The agent procrastinated an unreasonable length of time, the old policy expired, and the property was
destroyed by fire before the agent procured the insurance from Hart40
ford. The agent and Hartford were held liable as joint tortfeasors.
The court's rationale seems to have been that the contract to procure
created a duty, and the negligent failure to perform the duty was a
42
tort.41 Hartford was held liable on the theory of respondeat superior.
The attempt to argue defenses based on the law of contracts was cut
short by the holding that "the nature of the action is to be determined
from the pleadings" 43 and that the pleadings sounded in tort rather
than in contract.
Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921)

CHr=,

(dictum); 1

PLEADINGS 151 (16th ed. 1879).

37. "[IJt is said that a certificate or policy of insurance is simply a contract
like any other, as between individuals, and that there is no such thing as
negligence of a party in the matter of delay in entering into a contract. This
view overlooks the fact that the defendant holds and is acting under a
franchise from the state. The legislative policy, in granting this, proceeds
on the theory that chartering such association is in the interest of the public

to the end that indemnity on specific contingencies shall be provided those
who are eligible and desire it, and for their protection the state regulates,
inspects, and supervises their business. Having solicited applications for
insurance, and having so obtained them and received payment of the fees or
premiums exacted, they are bound either to furnish the indemnity the state
has authorized them to furnish or decline so to do within such reasonable
time as will enable them to act intelligently and advisedly thereon or suffer
the consequences flowing from their neglect so to do." Duffy v. Bankers' Life
Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087, 1089-90 (1913).
38. Cf. Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953),
discussed in text accompanying note 25 supra.
39. 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. 1009 (1918).
40. 174 Pac. at 1010.
41. The court seems intentionally to complicate its language and obfuscate
its meaning, but logical interpolation produces the rule: "[The agent's] conduct in procuring respondent [owner] to not renew his expiring policy,
coupled with his failure, because of his negligence, to keep that promise [to
procure insurance from Hartford], whereby respondent lost his property without the protection a policy of insurance would have afforded him, was a tort."
174 Pac. at 1010.
42. 174 Pac. at 1010. Note that the agent is thus held to be the agent of
the defendant Hartford in soliciting the insurance and as plaintiff's agent in
procuring.
43. Ibid.
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A limited number of courts have based recovery on a statute without specific reference to either tort or contract theories. In Latham
Mercantile & Commercial Co. v. Harrod" a statute provided that an
insurance company which failed to meet statutory requirements
would be liable for a five hundred dollar penalty and that any agent
aiding in such violation would likewise be liable for the same amount.
The defendant agent promised to procure insurance for an owner and
selected a company which had not complied with statutory requirements. The owner's property was destroyed, but recovery on the
policy was impossible because the insurance company was insolvent.
The owner recovered from the person who had promised to procure
on the theory that the purpose of the statute was to protect owners
from such contingencies and the defendant agent had helped the in45
surance company breach the statute and was liable for the damage.
On retrial it was held that recovery was not limited to the five hundred dollar penalty; the owner was compensated for his actual dam46
ages.
Is there any sound reason for the existence of two theories of recovery on the same fact situation? The answer in its simplest form seems
to be that contract and tort theories coexist in America because England allowed such coexistence and exported its concommitant products. 47 The contract theory was procreated by the law surrounding
the development of assumpsit,48 and the tort cause of action from the
action on the case. 49 The law of insurance seemed to have adopted
rather than sired these twin theories of recovery, and since it is probable that the developments did not originate with insurance, determining their date of origin and soundness seems out of place for this
article. But one may well ask whether one theory was propounded
and the second followed with the awareness that the first existed, or
whether misuse and misinterpretation of one led to an abortive crea50
tion of the second.
44. 71 Kan. 565, 81 Pac. 214 (1905).
45. 81 Pac. at 214.
46. Harrod v. Latham Mercantile & Commercial Co., 77 Kan. 466, 95 Pac. 11
(1908).
47. See Moore v. Mourgue, 2 Cowp. 479, 98 Eng. Rep. 1197 (K.B. 1776)
(dictum), which clearly indicates existence of the tort theory at the time of

the creation of the United States. And for contract considerations see Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75, 170 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1793).
48. PROSSER, TORTS § 81 (2d ed. 1955).

49. Ibid.
50. The contract theory of recovery holds that when an agent promises to

procure, the promise must be performed with reasonable care or the agent
is liable in damages for a breach of contract. The tort theory states that when
the duty emanating from the contract is not performed with reasonable care,
resulting damage creates a tort. One can readily see that somewhere in legal
history there may have been only a contract or tort theory and the language
used to describe the standard of performance was mistakenly interpreted and

a second theory of recovery was allowed.
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GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT

At least two jurisdictions and several textwriters phrase the standard of care in terms of due care and good faith.51 Thus a Washington
court stated that the question was whether the defendant agent had
used "good faith, reasonable skill, and ordinary diligence" 52 in his attempts to procure insurance for the principal. While one must note
that an agent must be loyal to his principal and refrain from conflicting interests, 53 discussing the standard of care in terms of good faith
seemingly adds nothing of value.
To illustrate, suppose that an agent is employed to procure insurance and investigates a prospective insurer with as much care as any
other reasonably diligent agent would use. The insurer is financially
shaky, it collapses after the insurance is given, and the insured has a
property loss but is unable to collect from the insurer. Through means
unrelated to the investigation the agent knew of the debilitation of
the company before the policy was written. Most jurisdictions would
probably hold the agent liable to the owner because the agent had
failed to use the care a reasonable insurance agent would have used
under the same or similar circumstances-and one circumstance is
that the agent knew of the unsound financial position of the company.
The Washington and California jurisdictions would probably hold
54
the agent liable on the theory that the agent had used bad faith.
REASONABLE CARE AND SKILL

The duty to use due care carries with it the implied warranty that
the agent possesses the skill that is ordinarily possessed by agents in
the field. 55 A failure to procure insurance caused by a lack of such

skill makes the defendant liable in contract or tort depending on the
jurisdiction in which the failure occurs and whether concurrent remedies exist.
51. Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash. 2d 370, 229 P.2d 542, 545 (1951); Colpe nv.
Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 16, 22 P.2d 35 (1933); 2 CoucH, INSviRANCE LAW § 469 (1929); STORY, LAW OF AGENCY § 191 (1839).
52. Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash. 2d 370, 229 P.2d 542, 545 (1951).
53. See generally MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 500 (4th ed. 1952).
54. The Washington court, in Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash. 2d 370, 229 P.2d
542 (1951), cites Couch, Couch in turn cites Story, and Story cites alleged
English cases using the "good faith" standard. The cases used by Couch do
not seem to use the good faith test, and the American cases cited by Story
refrain from use of the phrase. Couch uses the language: "[I]f an agent
accepts an order to insure, he . . . must exercise such reasonable skill and
ordinary diligence as may fairly be expected from a person in his profession
or situation . . . and in all this he is obligated to exercise the strictest ...
good faith toward both his employer and the insured." 2 COUCH, INSURANCE
LAW § 463 (1929).
55. Milliken v. Woodward, 64 N.J.L. 444, 45 Atl. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Burges
v. Jackson, 18 App. Div. 296, 46 N.Y. Supp. 326 (2d Dep't 1897); MECHEM,
OuTLNEs OF AGENCY §§ 524-25 (4th ed. 1952).

NOTES
DAMAGES

In the jurisdictions that allow the contract theory of recovery the
general rule is that "the liability of the defendant [agent] ... with
respect to loss or damage . . . is the same as that which would have

fallen upon the insurance company had the insurance been effectuated
as contemplated."5 6 In the case of tangible goods an owner's damages
would be the market value of the damaged goods at the time of physical injury. 57 Where the premium has not been paid before the suit,
the damages recoverable are reduced by the amount of the unpaid
premium. 58 When an owner fails to discover a lack of coverage due to
negligence in failing to read a policy and sues on the contract theory,
the recovery is reduced by the damage that could have been prevented
had the omission been found and corrected. 59 In the absence of proof
that the general practice is to insure for only partial value, the agent
is liable for the full value of the property. 6°
Generally, the tort theory of recovery is like the contract theory in
that the owner recovers damages equal to the amount that could have
been recovered if the policy had been procured. 61 A difference in treatment arises when the owner has failed to use the care that an ordinary
prudent owner would have used under like circumstances. Where contributory negligence is a complete bar to a plaintiff's action, the
owner's suit is defeated. However, in a suit based on the contract
theory the plaintiff will recover despite contributory negligence 2 but
in a reduced amount.
CAUSATION

Definitive opinions on causation in this field are practically nonexistent and this leads one to the conclusion that the ordinary causation tests prevail in the field of the agent's liability. The "but for" test
is the only observed standard. In Stevens v. Wafer 63 an owner desired fire insurance on his building and an agent promised to procure
but failed to obtain the policy before the building was consumed in
flames. The owner sued for breach of a contract and recovered. The
court held that the owner would have been insured and compensated
56. Mayhew v. Glazier, 68 Colo. 350, 189 Pac. 843, 846 (1920). See also Gay
v. Lavina, 61 Mont. 449, 202 Pac. 753 (1921).

57. See Dargan v. Robinson, 140 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
(dictum). And see Sheller v. Seattle Title Trust Co., 120 Wash. 140, 206 Pac.
847 (1922), where a statute is basis for the court's holding that the amount of
the policy is recoverable and the value of the property destroyed was not the

limit.
58. Derby v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230 S.W.2d 481 (1950); Sheller v.
Seattle Title Trust Co., 120 Wash. 140, 206 Pac. 847 (1922). The Sheller case
does not clearly indicate whether contract or tort is the theory of the suit.
59. Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).
60. Ela v. French, 11 N.H. 356 (1840).
61. Burges v. Jackson, 18 App. Div. 296, 46 N.Y. Supp. 326 (2d Dep't 1897).
62. Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).

63. 14 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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for his loss "but for" the agent's failure to procure.64 The owner's case

was made when he alleged that he contracted for insurance and that
the property was destroyed before the insurance was obtained-there
65
was no necessity of alleging the specific terms proposed.
The "but for" test has also been used under the tort theory of recovery.6 6 Whether the cause of the loss lies at the doorstep of the
agent is a jury question. 67 A failure to procure is not actionable when
the policy would have been void due to a misrepresentation. 68
DEFENSES

Generally, contributory negligence on the part of the owner prevents recovery on a tort pleading. It would seem possible for an
agent to intentionally refuse to procure and thus the defense of contributory negligence would be vitiated. But if an owner sues for a
breach of contract to procure insurance, a failure by the owner to use
due care would reduce but not defeat recovery.69 Arguably, comparative negligence jurisdictions would reach a result similar to the contract treatment but no cases so holding have been found.
The defense of the statute of limitations accentuates the need to distinquish between the contract and tort theories of recovery. Where
the allowable time for suit differs, one theory might be barred while
the other is extant. Generally the tort statute will be more abbreviated and each jurisdiction would present its singular distinctive com-,
parison. Where the suit cannot be brought on the contract because
the agent has not received consideration, the only possible theory of
recovery will be tort and as a result only the tort limitation will apply.
The lack of a writing does not defeat the owner's recovery because
the agent's oral promise to procure binds him to the contract. 0 Since
the duty to procure exists without a writing signed by the agent, a
tort suit raises only the question of whether the duty was breached by
a failure of the agent to use due care. Thus there is similarity of treatment under the two theories.
At times an agent is sued as an insurer. It has been held by special
application of statute that such an agent is not liable as an insurer
64. Stevens v. Wafer, 14 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
65. Ibid. But the amount of insurance must be established or the action
will fail. Wagner v. Falbe & Co., 272 Wis. 25, 74 N.W.2d 742 (1956).
66. Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
67. Ibid.
68. Alsop v. Coit, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 40 (1815).
69. Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).
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NOTES

19591

because of noncompliance with statutory requirements for qualifying
as a business entity to insure.7 1 But where this assumption of liability
is not barred by statute an agent may represent so broadly that he is
held contractually bound.7 2
LABILITY TO OTHERS

Aside from liability to an owner, apparently the agent may be sued
successfully by an insurer after company liability under the principle
of respondeat superior.73 In Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n,7 4 decedent
sought life insurance and the prospective insurer's agent negligently
carried out the task of securing the desired insurance. Death came before the policy was contracted. The estate of the decedent recovered
on the ground that the defendant insurer was liable for the torts of
its agent.75 It would seem to follow that the insurance company could
recover its loss from the negligent agent.
An interesting problem is posed by asking the question of whether
a proposed beneficiary of a life insurance policy can recover against an
agent who negligently fails to secure the desired contract. It has been
held that no duty is owed by the agent to such a prospective beneficiary.7 6
CONCLUSION

An agent or broker who promises to procure insurance for another
must perform that promise with reasonable care. A failure to procure
due to a lack of reasonable care will be deemed negligence and the
agent may be liable in contract or tort. The basis for the contract
action is that the contract to procure insurance created a duty to use
reasonable care to obtain the insurance, and the failure to obtain due
to a lack of reasonable care is a breach of contract. Where tort recovery is allowed, the contract is viewed as creating a duty to procure
insurance and the negligent performance of the duty is a tort.
Recovery has generally-been limited to the person who sought the
71. Milwaukee Bedding Co. v. Graebner, 182 Wis. 171, 196 N.W. 533 (1923).
The statute used read: "No unauthorized insurance company or other un-

authorized insurer shall hereafter make or issue, directly or indirectly, any
policy of insurance on property in this state, except as specifically authorized
by law. All such contracts are declared to be unlawful, void, and unenforceable, and no action in law or equity shall be maintained on any such contract
in any court." 196 N.W. at 535.

72. ElI Dee Clothing Co. v. Marsh, 247 N.Y. 392, 160 N.E. 651 (1928).
73. See Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913),
where an agent failed to insure decedent's life and the company insurer was
held liable for the "tort" of its agent. As to an agent's liability to an insurer
when the insurer tells the agent to cancel a policy and the agent negligently
fails to cancel before the insured contingency occurs, see MECHEM, OUTLINES OF
AGENCY § 515 (4th ed. 1952).

74. 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
75. Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).

76. Ibid.

